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A REASONABLE BELIEF: IN SUPPORT OF LGBT
PLAINTIFFS’ TITLE VII RETALIATION CLAIMS
ERIN E. BUZUVIS†
ABSTRACT
When an LGBT employee is punished for complaining about discrimination in the workplace, he or she has two potential causes of action
under Title VII: first, a challenge to the underlying discrimination, and
second, a challenge to the resulting retaliation. The first claim is vulnerable to dismissal under courts’ narrow interpretation of Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination “because of sex” as applied to LGBT plaintiffs.
But such an outcome need not determine the fate of the second claim.
Faithful application of retaliation law’s “reasonable belief” standard,
which protects a plaintiff from reprisal so long as she reasonably believed that she was complaining about unlawful discrimination, should
allow LGBT plaintiffs to successfully challenge the reprisal, even if the
court determines that the underlying discrimination was not “because of
sex.” This Article provides several arguments in support of such reasonable belief, in order to strengthen both the law’s protection from retaliation in general as well as the challenges of obtaining relief for workplace
discrimination against LGBT individuals.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the prevalence of discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) employees in the workplace,1 Title VII
does not expressly prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation or transgender status. For this reason, until such time
as Congress changes the law, an LGBT employee who suffers discrimination on the job must formulate his or her claim as one of sex discrimination in order to gain relief under federal law. Fortunately, this has been
possible in many cases. Courts have found Title VII’s prohibition against
sex discrimination to apply where plaintiffs were targeted for their gender nonconformity2 or change of sex,3 and where the plaintiff was harassed in a sexual manner.4 At the same time, LGBT plaintiffs frequently
run up against the limits of these approaches, such as when courts narrowly interpret the plaintiff’s evidence of gender nonconformity5 or adhere to restrictive precedents that foreclose expansive definitions of sex
discrimination.6 As such, sex discrimination claims are a second-best
solution for LGBT plaintiffs—an insufficient work-around to the problem created by Title VII’s omission of sexual orientation and gender
identity as protected characteristics.
With a toolbox limited to second-best solutions, it is useful to have
as many as possible from which to choose. To that end, this Article seeks
to make a modest contribution to the toolbox by generating support for
1. Jennifer C. Pizer et al., Evidence of Persistent and Pervasive Workplace Discrimination
Against LGBT People: The Need for Federal Legislation Prohibiting Discrimination and Providing
for Equal Employment Benefits, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 715, 719 (2012).
2. EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 472 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Prowel v.
Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 292 (3d Cir. 2009); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573
(6th Cir. 2004); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); Schmedding v.
Tnemec Co., 187 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 1999).
3. Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 210–11 (D.D.C. 2006).
4. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002); Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1217 (D. Or. 2002).
5. E.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006) (rejecting gay
plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim because he “failed to allege that he did not conform to traditional
gender stereotypes in any observable way at work”).
6. E.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2007).
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another work-around: retaliation claims. Many times, particularly in harassment cases, an LGBT employee who suffers discrimination on the job
also endures reprisals for having reported it. These reprisals ought to
qualify for protection under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, even in
cases where the underlying discrimination does not appear to the court to
be an instance of actionable sex discrimination. With few exceptions,7
however, courts often summarily dismiss attendant retaliation claims
with no further analysis other than to note that the underlying discrimination was not itself a violation of law.8 This approach flies in the face of
Supreme Court precedent, which has interpreted Title VII’s antiretaliation provision to potentially apply in cases where the plaintiff reasonably believes that the complained-of discrimination violates the statute.9
There are many reasons why LGBT employees could reasonably
believe that discrimination about which they complain violates Title VII.
First, though an erroneous belief, it is widely assumed that a federal ban
on sexual orientation discrimination already exists.10 This collective assumption likely derives from an increasing number of state-level protections against discrimination and the well-known political and legislative
victories in the marriage-equality movement. Second, even if a court
rejects that it is reasonable to believe that federal law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, that court should still be willing
to consider that an LGBT employee reasonably believed that the complained-of discrimination was actionable sex discrimination. The reasonableness of this belief is underscored by the fact that federal courts no
longer categorically deny sex discrimination claims by LGBT plaintiffs.
Most circuit courts of appeal have either decided sex discrimination
claims in favor of an LGBT plaintiff,11 or at least addressed the possibil7. E.g., Dawson v. Entek Int’l, 630 F.3d 928, 936–37 (9th Cir. 2011); McCarthy v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. CIV. 2:09–2495 WBS DAD, 2011 WL 4006634, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept.
8, 2011). In McCarthy the court stated:
There cannot be any doubt that the plaintiffs in this case were reasonable in believing
that Title VII prohibited defendant from terminating their coworker based on his sexual
orientation. Not only has there been a growing gay rights movement in this country, the
courts have also recognized sexual orientation as a status that merits heightened protection.
McCarthy, 2011 WL 4006634, at *4 (citation omitted).
8. E.g., Larson v. United Air Lines, 482 F. App’x 344, 351 (10th Cir. 2012); Gilbert v.
Country Music Ass’n, 432 F. App’x 516, 520 (6th Cir. 2011); Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods.,
Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1060 (7th Cir. 2003); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc.,
224 F.3d 701, 707 (7th Cir. 2000).
9. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001).
10. A survey by the Center for American Progress found that “9 of out [sic] 10 voters erroneously think that a federal law is already in place protecting gay and transgender people from workplace discrimination.” Jeff Krehely, Polls Show Huge Public Support for Gay and Transgender
FOR
A M.
PROGRESS,
June
2,
2011,
Workplace
Protections,
CENTER
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/news/2011/06/02/9716/polls-show-huge-publicsupport-for-gay-and-transgender-workplace-protections/.
11. E.g., EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 457 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Prowel
v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 293 (3d Cir. 2009); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566,
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ity of doing so in cases where the plaintiff properly alleged and supported a claim based on gender nonconformity.12 Moreover, interpretations
of Title VII—whether by the courts or, most recently, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)13—are increasingly recognizing the inextricable convergence of sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity.14 Even if the judge in a plaintiff’s case does not think, for
example, that “faggot” is a gender-based slur,15 it is hardly unreasonable
for the plaintiff to believe that it is. In laying out support for an LGBT
plaintiff’s reasonable belief in the illegality of the underlying discrimination, this Article hopes to strengthen the potential for retaliation claims to
be successful in general, and in particular for those plaintiffs who would
otherwise be without recourse under Title VII.
Part I of this Article will first explain briefly why, despite courts’
expanding interpretations of sex discrimination, Title VII’s prohibition
on sex discrimination remains a limited remedy for workplace discrimination against LGBT employees. Part II examines Title VII’s antiretaliation provision and the reasonable belief doctrine and provides examples of retaliation cases predicated on anti-LGBT discrimination. Finally, Part III provides support for LGBT plaintiffs’ reasonable belief
that underlying discrimination is unlawful.
I. SEX DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS AS SECOND-BEST SOLUTIONS FOR
LGBT PLAINTIFFS
Notwithstanding their vulnerability to bias and harassment on the
job, Title VII only offers limited protection to LGBT employees. As this
Part will describe, early judicial interpretations of Title VII foreclosed
interpretations that would have extended the statute’s prohibition on sex
discrimination to also include discrimination based on homosexuality or
transgender status per se. The Supreme Court’s 1989 ruling in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins16 has provided relief to some LGBT plaintiffs, but
only in cases where discrimination based on gender nonconformity, read
narrowly, is also present. Notwithstanding the more robust view of sex
discrimination that is emerging from the EEOC, the courts generally
578 (6th Cir. 2004); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 877–78 (9th Cir. 2001); Schmedding v. Tnemec Co., 187 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 1999).
12. E.g., Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 224 (2d Cir. 2005); Bibby v. Phila.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d
Cir. 2000); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 265 (1st Cir. 1999).
13. Macy v. Holder, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012).
14. Henderson v. Labor Finders of Va., Inc., No. 3:12cv600, 2013 WL 1352158, at *4 (E.D.
Va. Apr. 2, 2013) (“Stereotypical notions about how men and women should behave will often
necessarily blur into ideas about heterosexuality and homosexuality.” (quoting Howell v. N. Cent.
Coll., 320 F. Supp. 2d 717, 723 (N.D. Ill. 2004)) (internal quotation mark omitted)); Centola v.
Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 410 (D. Mass. 2002) (“Sexual orientation harassment is often, if not
always, motivated by a desire to enforce heterosexually defined gender norms.”).
15. E.g., Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1060, 1067–68 (7th Cir.
2003).
16. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion).
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have yet to embrace this view. Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination thus
remains a second-best solution to employers’ discrimination against
LGBT employees.
A. Early Courts Foreclose Broad Interpretations of Sex Discrimination
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal employment
discrimination statute, prohibits an employer from refusing to hire, firing,
or otherwise discriminating against any individual “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”17 It does not expressly enumerate sexual orientation or gender identity as protected
characteristics, and some early judicial decisions under Title VII interpreted this omission to exclude LGBT plaintiffs from the protections of
the statute. For example, in 1979, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
deciding DeSantis v. Pacific Telegraph & Telephone Co.,18 rejected several arguments that sought to position sexual orientation discrimination
as a subset of sex discrimination, including the argument that discrimination against a male employee who chooses male sexual partners is sex
discrimination in that it treats him differently from a female employee
who also chooses a male sexual partner, as well as the argument that
sexual orientation discrimination relies on stereotypes about hegemonic
masculinity.19 The court reasoned that any argument that renders all sexual orientation discrimination to fall within the ambit of sex discrimination would have constituted impermissible “bootstrap[ping]” by defying
Congress’s intentional exclusion of sexual orientation as a protected
characteristic under Title VII.20 Five years later, the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines21 created a similar categorical exclusion for transgender plaintiffs. In that case, the court dismissed a case
against an airline that fired a pilot after discovering that she had had sex
reassignment surgery. The court rejected Ulane’s argument that the discrimination she endured was “because of . . . sex,” either as discrimination against Ulane because of her female sex or because of her change of
sex.22 Both arguments would have required the court to interpret sex to
mean something other than biological sex—an interpretation the court
believed was foreclosed by congressional intent.
B. Price Waterhouse Offers Some Relief to LGBT Plaintiffs
The Supreme Court’s later decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
rejected a narrow reading of sex discrimination and provided new ammunition for LGBT plaintiffs to challenge discrimination in the workplace. In that case, the plaintiff, Ann Hopkins, had been passed over for
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012).
608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 330.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1084, 1087.
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promotion in her accounting firm because the partners thought she was
too aggressive for a woman.23 The Court viewed this as impermissible
sex discrimination because the employer’s practice of rewarding aggressiveness in men while objecting to aggressive women placed Hopkins in
an “intolerable and impermissible catch 22.”24 With this conclusion, the
Court suggested an expanded definition of sex that includes not just
whether someone is male or female, but also how one presents one’s
gender.25
Lower courts have come to read Price Waterhouse for the proposition that Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees who do not conform to stereotyped notions of masculinity and
femininity. In Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises,26 the Ninth Circuit recognized that its earlier holding in DeSantis was at least partially
abrogated by Price Waterhouse when it held an employer liable for harassment that targeted a male employee because of his gender nonconformity.27 Though the plaintiff in that case was not identified as gay, the
nature of the harassment he endured suggested that his co-workers perceived him to be so; they called him “she” and other “vulgar name[s] . . .
cast in female terms[,]” taunted him for effeminate mannerisms, and
teased him for not sleeping with a female co-worker.28 Like the Ninth
Circuit, most courts have similarly held that Title VII prohibits anti-gay
harassment that demonstrably targets the plaintiff’s gender nonconformity.29
Price Waterhouse also created a potential Title VII remedy for
transgender employees who endure discrimination on the job. In Smith v.
City of Salem,30 for example, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed
that an employer’s adverse treatment of a transgender employee who had
begun to express his female gender identity on the job was prohibited by
Title VII because it targeted the plaintiff for failing to conform to stereotypes consonant with the sex (male) they perceived the plaintiff to be.31
In so holding, the court acknowledged that earlier precedent such as

23. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989) (plurality opinion).
24. Id. at 251.
25. Id.
26. 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001).
27. Id. at 874–75.
28. Id. at 874 (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. E.g., EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 449 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Prowel
v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 293 (3d Cir. 2009); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
260 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2001); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000); Higgins v.
New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261–62 (1st Cir. 1999); Schmedding v. Tnemec Co.,
187 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 1999); Doe ex rel. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 580 (7th Cir.
1997), vacated, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998).
30. 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
31. Id. at 574–75.
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Ulane had been eviscerated by the Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse.32 Other courts have ruled similarly.33
C. Narrow Interpretations of Price Waterhouse Foreclose Relief to Many
LGBT Plaintiffs
Despite broadening the scope of actionable sex discrimination, the
sex-stereotyping argument created by Price Waterhouse offers only limited protection to LGBT plaintiffs. Most significantly for gay and lesbian
plaintiffs, courts apply Price Waterhouse only to gender-nonconforming
behavior or appearance that is visible on the job.34 A remnant of the antibootstrapping rationale, this limitation precludes gay and lesbian plaintiffs from arguing that homosexuality per se is a departure from sex stereotypes that is protected from discrimination.35 This limitation ensures
that only gay and lesbian plaintiffs who are visibly gendernonconforming—a gay male with effeminate mannerisms, or a lesbian
with masculine ones—can potentially allege an actionable claim of sex
discrimination.
Gay and lesbian plaintiffs also have difficulty proving that the discrimination they experienced was based on sex. Some courts view antigay bias as an alternative to gender-based motivation for harassment, and
do not see them as overlapping or related. In these courts, evidence of
anti-gay animus—plaintiff was called a faggot, for example—reflects a
singular homophobic motive for harassment that forecloses the possibility that the plaintiff’s gender was also a target.36 With few exceptions,37
32. Id. at 573.
33. Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 741 (6th Cir. 2005); Lopez v. River Oaks
Imaging & Diagnostic Grp., 542 F. Supp. 2d 653, 656 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (examining action brought
by transsexual male-to-female (MTF) plaintiff whose job offer was revoked after she came to the
interview presenting as a woman); Doe v. United Consumer Fin. Servs., No. 1:01 CV 1112, 2001
WL 34350174, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 2001); see also Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316–17
(11th Cir. 2011) (holding that discrimination against a transgender plaintiff is sex discrimination for
purposes of applying heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, noting that “[a] person
is defined as transgender precisely because of the perception that his or her behavior transgresses
gender stereotypes”).
34. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2006) (rejecting plaintiff’s
argument that “his supposed sexual practices, [where] he behaved more like a woman” could qualify
as actionable sex-stereotyping under Price Waterhouse); Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d
211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient to show that she was discriminated against for her gender nonconforming appearance, rather than her sexual orientation).
35. Dawson, 398 F.3d at 218. The court stated:
When utilized by an avowedly homosexual plaintiff, . . . gender stereotyping claims can
easily present problems for an adjudicator. This is for the simple reason that
“[s]tereotypical notions about how men and women should behave will often necessarily
blur into ideas about heterosexuality and homosexuality.” Like other courts, we have
therefore recognized that a gender stereotyping claim should not be used to “bootstrap
protection for sexual orientation into Title VII.”
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Howell v. N. Cent. Coll., 320 F. Supp. 2d 717, 723 (N.D. Ill. 2004);
Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000)).
36. Kay v. Independence Blue Cross, 142 F. App’x 48, 50–51 (3d Cir. 2005) (interpreting
plaintiff’s harassment as being related to his sexual orientation rather than gender, where plaintiff
was called a “faggot” and other slurs, but was also told “[a] real man in the corporate world would
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courts have generally not embraced the view that anti-gay harassment is
the means by which some workplace environments police gender
norms.38
The limits of Price Waterhouse are made more significant when
viewed in the context of courts’ reluctance, since Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc.,39 to find that the sexual nature of harassment
satisfies the requirement that harassment be motivated by the victim’s
sex. In Oncale, the Court rejected the idea that same-sex harassment was
categorically excluded from protection under Title VII, in contradiction
to some lower courts that had so held.40 However, the Court went on to
emphasize that a plaintiff still needs to demonstrate that harassment was
motivated by sex, such as by offering evidence that (1) the harasser is
homosexual, and therefore motivated by sexual desire; (2) the harasser is
generally hostile to the presence of the plaintiff’s sex in the workplace;
or (3) the harasser in a mixed-sex workplace singles out one sex for harassing treatment.41 Notably, the Court did not suggest that the highly
sexualized nature of harassment could also satisfy this burden; if it had,
the Court would not have had to remand Oncale’s case on this question,
since his allegations—that co-workers restrained him while one placed
his penis on Oncale’s neck and arm, that they threatened to rape him, and
that they forcibly pushed a bar of soap into his anus while he was shownot come to work with an earring in his ear. But I guess you will never be a ‘real man’!!!!!!” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that
plaintiff repeatedly called “faggot” and other gay slurs did not allege gender nonconformity claim
under Price Waterhouse); see Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1086 (7th Cir. 2000);
EEOC v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-2569-TWT, 2008 WL 4098723, at *17 (N.D. Ga.
Aug. 28, 2008); Mowery v. Escambia Cnty. Utils. Auth., No. 3:04CV382-RS-EMT, 2006 WL
327965, at *7 (N.D. Fla. 2006) (“Being forty years old, owning a home and truck, living alone, and
not discussing one’s sexual partners are not feminine gender traits. These characteristics may reflect
stereotypes associated with a homosexual lifestyle, but they are not stereotypes associated with a
feminine gender.”); see also Zachary A. Kramer, Of Meat and Manhood, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 287,
312, 314 (2011) (criticizing this approach and arguing that unprotected traits like sexual orientation
should be neutral for purposes of a sex discrimination claim).
37. E.g., Henderson v. Labor Finders of Va., Inc., No. 3:12cv600, 2013 WL 1352158, at *1–
2, *7 (E.D. Va. Apr. 2, 2013); Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 410 (D. Mass. 2002) (“Sexual
orientation harassment is often, if not always, motivated by a desire to enforce heterosexually defined gender norms. In fact, stereotypes about homosexuality are directly related to our stereotypes
about the proper roles of men and women.”).
38. Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role
Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 633 (1992)
(“Homophobia is both a symptom and a primary weapon of gender discrimination; any serious
attempt to attain gender equality must aim to remove it.”); Kramer, supra note 36, at 313; Vicki
Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1776–77 (1998); Richard F.
Storrow, Gender Typing in Stereo: The Transgender Dilemma in Employment Discrimination, 55
ME. L. REV. 118, 142 (2002).
39. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
40. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118 (5th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 523
U.S. 75 (1998); Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451–52 (5th Cir. 1994), abrogated by
Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75, 77; see also Richard F. Storrow, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims After
Oncale: Defining the Boundaries of Actionable Conduct, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 677, 692–93 (1998)
(describing the legal landscape for same-sex harassment prior to Oncale).
41. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80–81.
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ering—clearly would have qualified.42 With one notable exception,43 the
courts have generally been reluctant to conclude after Oncale that the
sexualized nature of harassing conduct can support a claim that same-sex
harassment is motivated by the victim’s sex—an unfortunate limitation
for gay employees who are particularly vulnerable to same-sex harassment. For example, in Vickers v. Fairfield Medical Center,44 the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals denied that the plaintiff, a gay man, had endured harassment because of sex where the harassment, while sexual in
nature, did not reflect the harasser’s sexual desire, general hostility towards men, or differential treatment towards men.45 While courts generally do allow gay plaintiffs to use gender nonconformity as the basis for
arguing that harassment targets them because of sex, cases like Vickers
show that the limitations of this doctrine often leave gay plaintiffs without any remedy at all.46
Price Waterhouse is also a limited remedy for discrimination
against transgender employees in that courts may potentially apply it
only to situations like in Smith, where the employee begins to transition
on the job and is targeted for discrimination for dressing or behaving in
ways that belie the employee’s natal sex. As with homosexuality, most
courts are unwilling to consider being transgender per se as gender nonconformity. While many cases of discrimination against a transgender
employee will also involve discrimination for failing to appear and behave in accordance with natal sex stereotypes, and thus be actionable,
some cases will fall outside of this zone of overlap. Discrimination that
targets a transgender employee whose transgender identity is discovered
(or disclosed) but who does not (or not yet) appear as their affirmed sex
at work may not be prohibited under Price Waterhouse.47 And even in
42. Id. at 82; Oncale, 83 F.3d. at 118–19.
43. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1066–68 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
(concluding that plaintiff’s allegations of “physical conduct of a sexual nature” state a cause of
action for sexual harassment under Title VII (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Edward J.
Reeves & Lainie D. Decker, Before ENDA: Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Protections in
the Workplace Under Federal Law, 20 L. & SEXUALITY 61, 68 (2011) (pointing out the unique
nature of the Rene decision).
44. 453 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2006).
45. Id. at 765.
46. Id. at 763; McCown v. St. John’s Health Sys., Inc., 349 F.3d 540, 543 (8th Cir. 2003);
Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 264 (3d Cir. 2001); Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 240 F.3d 255, 261–62 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Reeves & Decker, supra note 43, at 68–69;
Kavita B. Ramakrishnan, Inconsistent Legal Treatment of Unwanted Sexual Advances: A Study of
the Homosexual Advance Defense, Street Harassment, and Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 26
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 291, 337–39 (2011) (pointing out that heterosexual men have an
easier time prevailing on same-sex harassment claims than queer men).
47. Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 211 (D.D.C. 2006). The court stated:
A transsexual plaintiff might successfully state a Price Waterhouse-type claim if the
claim is that he or she has been discriminated against because of a failure to act or appear
masculine or feminine enough for an employer . . . but such a claim must actually arise
from the employee's appearance or conduct and the employer's stereotypical perceptions.
Such a claim is not stated here, where the complaint alleges that Schroer's non-selection
was the direct result of her disclosure of her gender dysphoria and of her intention to
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cases where a transgender employee is dressing or behaving in a manner
that belies stereotypes of his or her natal sex, courts may not agree that
this was the employer’s motivation for discrimination.48 For instance, the
plaintiff in Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority49 was a transgender bus driver who, while on the job, had begun the process of transitioning from
male to female.50 She sued the transit authority, which fired her when she
did not agree to refrain from using women’s bathrooms along her route.51
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected her argument that
using a women’s bathroom on the job was gender nonconforming behavior that was protected from discrimination under Price Waterhouse.52 As
such, the employer could rely on its concern about bathroom usage as a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason in satisfaction of its burden under
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.53
Even in cases where the gender nonconformity theory could potentially apply, it is not always the plaintiff’s desired approach, since it can
be undermining to a transgender plaintiff’s gender identity to have to
seek relief as a nonconforming member of their natal, rather than affirmed, sex.54 It also validates gender stereotypes as such, since describbegin presenting herself as a woman, or her display of photographs of herself in feminine
attire, or both.
Id. (citation omitted). The court went on to deny the employer’s motion to dismiss anyway, and later
concluded after trial that the plaintiff had presented evidence of discrimination based on gender
nonconformity. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 308 (D.D.C. 2008); see also Oiler v.
Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ.A. 00–3114, 2002 WL 31098541, at *2 (E.D. La. 2002) (employer
terminated transgender employee after learning the employee identified as transgender and crossdressed outside of work); Jason Lee, Note, Lost in Transition: The Challenges of Remedying
Transgender Employment Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 423, 441
(2012).
48. Mary Kristen Kelly, Note, (Trans)forming Traditional Interpretations of Title VII: “Because of Sex” and the Transgender Dilemma, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 219, 230 (2010)
(citing Myers v. Cuyahoga Cnty., 182 Fed. App’x 510, 520 (6th Cir. 2006)) (describing a case in
which a transgender plaintiff’s harassment claim was dismissed “because the only evidence she was
able to show was that her supervisor referred to her as a ‘he/she,’ which,” while offensive, did not
constitute evidence of the harasser’s animus towards her gender nonconformity).
49. 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).
50. Id. at 1218–19.
51. Id. at 1219.
52. Id. at 1224.
53. Id. McDonnell Douglas allows a plaintiff to satisfy the requirement of proving discriminatory intent based on circumstantial, rather than direct, evidence of such motive. McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973). A plaintiff who satisfies the elements of a prima facie
case shifts the burden to the defendant to demonstrate a nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment action, which the plaintiff may rebut with evidence that the nondiscriminatory reason is
pretext for discrimination. Id. In Etsitty, the court assumed without deciding that the plaintiff had
met her burden to satisfy the prima facie case. 502 F.3d at 1224. After accepting the transit authority’s rationale as legitimate and nondiscriminatory, the court then determined that Etsitty had not
proffered evidence sufficient to show that the bathroom usage rationale was pretext for discrimination based on sex/gender nonconformity. Id. at 1227.
54. Elizabeth M. Glazer & Zachary A. Kramer, Transitional Discrimination, 18 TEMP. POL. &
CIV. RTS. L. REV. 651, 666 (2009) (“Our difficulty with the Smith case is that the court reduces
Smith’s transgender identity to little more than a fashion choice to wear women’s clothing.”); Kelly,
supra note 48, at 230; Sharon M. McGowan, Working with Clients to Develop Compatible Visions of
What It Means to “Win” a Case: Reflections on Schroer v. Billington, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
205, 205 (2010) (quoting Diane Schroer as saying, “I haven’t gone through all this only to have a

2014]

A REASONABLE BELIEF

939

ing a person’s behavior or appearance as gender nonconforming implies
there is a “correct” gender for whatever behavior or appearance is at issue.55 This might not feel right to some transgender plaintiffs, particularly if their gender identity is outside the gender binary altogether.
D. Emerging Alternatives to Price Waterhouse
Because of these limitations, it is promising that alternative interpretations of Title VII’s application to transgender plaintiffs have begun
to emerge. In 2008, a district court judge in Washington, D.C. interpreted
the statute’s ban on sex discrimination to include discrimination on the
basis of one’s transsexuality. In that case, Schroer v. Billington,56 the
Library of Congress revoked a job offer it had made to “David” Schroer
(later Diane) when she disclosed her transgender status and intent to start
work as a woman.57 In the lawsuit that followed, the judge ruled in her
favor on two alternative grounds. First, the court applied Price Waterhouse to find that the discrimination against Schroer was discrimination
because of sex, relying on evidence that the hiring supervisor was uncomfortable with the fact that someone she had come to know as a man
would be wearing a dress and presenting as a woman in contravention of
stereotyped masculinity.58 Then the court went on to hold that even in the
absence of sex stereotyping, the employer had violated Title VII because
refusing to hire someone who changes their sex targets that person because of sex.59 It is therefore sex discrimination in the same sense that
refusing to hire someone because they have converted from one religion
to another is discrimination on the basis of religion.60 The reasoning in
this opinion extends a broader range of protection to transgender plaintiffs than Price Waterhouse would alone because it is available to
court vindicate my rights as a gender non-conforming man” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Storrow, supra note 38, at 149–50.
55. Devi Rao, Gender Identity Discrimination Is Sex Discrimination: Protecting Transgender
Students from Bullying and Harassment Using Title IX, 28 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 245, 252, 263
(2013); cf. Judith Butler, Appearances Aside, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 55, 62 (2000) (“Antidiscrimination
law participates in the very practices it seeks to regulate; antidiscrimination law can become an
instrument of discrimination in the sense that it must reiterate—and entrench—the stereotypical or
discriminatory version of the social category it seeks to eliminate.”).
56. 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008).
57. Id. at 295–99.
58. Id. at 305. The judge in this case had, in an earlier decision, acknowledged the potential
limitations of framing the discrimination in Schroer’s case as that of gender nonconformity:
Schroer is not seeking acceptance as a man with feminine traits. She seeks to express her
female identity, not as an effeminate male, but as a woman. She does not wish to go
against the gender grain, but with it. She has embraced the cultural mores dictating that
“Diane” is a female name and that women wear feminine attire. The problem she faces is
not because she does not conform to the Library’s stereotypes about how men and women should look and behave—she adopts those norms. Rather, her problems stem from the
Library’s intolerance toward a person like her, whose gender identity does not match her
anatomical sex.
Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 210–11 (D.D.C. 2006). The court went on to deny the
Library’s motion to dismiss anyway. Id. at 213.
59. Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 307–08.
60. Id. at 306.
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transgender plaintiffs even in the absence of evidence that the employer’s
motivation for discrimination was the plaintiff’s gender nonconformity
rather than her transsexuality per se.61
While Schroer’s “change of sex” rationale has yet to be cited by
other federal courts, the EEOC incorporated its rationale into a decision
that broadly construed the agency’s jurisdiction to investigate claims of
sex discrimination filed by transgender employees. In Macy v. Holder,62
the EEOC determined that a transgender applicant who was rejected for a
job with a federal agency had successfully alleged a complaint of sex
discrimination.63 The EEOC employed a broad reading of Price Waterhouse to conclude that gender nonconformity includes not only visibly
transitioning on the job, as in Smith, but even simply identifying as
transgender.64 Moreover, the EEOC held that transgender plaintiffs were
not limited to alleging claims of sex discrimination based only on the
gender nonconformity approach.65 An employer who discriminates because an employee changes sex or identifies as transgender has “relied
on [the employee’s] gender in making its decision,” which is prohibited
under Title VII.66
The EEOC’s decision employs a broad definition of sex discrimination—broader than any courts have used to date. While it is likely to be
influential on the courts, the extent of this influence remains to be seen.
Many courts will likely defer to it as a well-reasoned interpretation of
Title VII. However, Macy’s status as an adjudicatory decision that is
technically only binding on the federal sector does not necessarily require courts to extend deference in cases involving private employers.67
As a result, courts could still reject it on grounds that it conflicts with
earlier precedent from the Ulane line of cases that foreclose Title VII
protection from discrimination because of one’s transgender status.
II. TITLE VII’S ANTI-RETALIATION PROVISION AND LGBT PLAINTIFFS’
REASONABLE BELIEFS
As the previous Part makes clear, Title VII offers LGBT plaintiffs
limited means to redress direct instances of employment discrimination.
As this Part will show, LGBT plaintiffs have also had limited success
pursuing retaliation claims in cases where the predicate discrimination
61. See generally Lee, supra note 47.
62. Macy v. Holder, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012).
63. Id. at *1.
64. Id. at *7–8.
65. Id. at *10.
66. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251
(1989) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
67. Cody Perkins, Comment, Sex and Sexual Orientation: Title VII After Macy v. Holder, 65
ADMIN. L. REV. 427, 437 (2013) (“Similarly, EEOC adjudicatory decisions are granted some judicial
deference, and although they are not binding on anyone outside the federal sector, they are often
treated as indications of what will constitute ‘good practice’ in the future.”).
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was not itself unlawful. As explained in this Part, courts have taken an
increasingly narrow view of conduct that is protected under Title VII’s
prohibition against retaliation. Notwithstanding critiques of this problematic approach, it has been employed in cases involving gay plaintiffs.
Yet, the fact that some courts have read the law to offer broader protection against gay and other LGBT plaintiffs suggests and lays the
groundwork for a more promising alternative approach.
A. Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision
Protection against retaliation is essential to the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws.68 Without it, whistleblowers would be reluctant to
report and seek remedies to redress discrimination.69 Accordingly, Congress included express statutory language in Title VII that prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who complain, whether formally or informally, about discrimination made unlawful by the statute.70
However, courts have long held that a plaintiff may prevail under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision even if the conduct complained of
(i.e., the predicate discrimination) is not actually unlawful.71 As Professor Brake explains, “[p]rotection from retaliation would mean little if it
were otherwise.”72 Most employees do not have specific knowledge
about discrimination law, and even those who do would be hard pressed
to predict how judges and juries would apply that law in a specific case.73
If protection from retaliation was contingent on the employee guessing
right in the face of such uncertainty, many would avoid the risky act of
whistleblowing.74

68. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 180 (2005) (interpreting Title IX’s
implied right of action to include retaliation claims, even though such protections are not expressly
contained in the statute); see also Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s Antiretaliation Principle,
61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375, 377–78 (2010).
69. Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 25–26 (2005).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012) states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any
of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this [subchapter], or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this [subchapter].
The two clauses defining protected conduct under this provision are generally known as the opposition clause and the participation clause, respectively. See, e.g., DIANNE AVERY ET AL.,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE
165, 168 (8th ed. 2010).
71. Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1004–06 (5th Cir. 1969); Sias v. City
Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978) (extending this rationale to the opposition
clause as well by reasoning that EEOC enforcement “would be severely chilled” if Title VII’s protection against retaliation under the participation clause only applied to meritorious EEOC complaints).
72. Brake, supra note 69, at 76.
73. Id. at 76–77.
74. Id. at 77; Pizer et al., supra note 1, at 734 (“LGBT employees are often reluctant to pursue
claims for fear of retaliation or of ‘outing’ themselves further in their workplace.”).
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B. The Reasonable Belief Standard
When an employee complains of discrimination in the context of a
formal EEOC proceeding, the employee is generally protected from retaliation as long as the underlying complaint is not false or malicious.75
However, in informal contexts, such as an internal complaint to the employer, an employee’s protection is more narrow, extending only to situations where the employee has a good faith, reasonable belief that the
predicate discrimination is unlawful.76 Early courts applied this standard
to broaden, not narrow, the range of conduct protected from retaliation.
Compared to the possible alternative of requiring plaintiffs to prove that
the underlying discrimination was unlawful,77 the “reasonable belief”
standard allowed for robust protection against retaliation while still ensuring employers’ freedom to address “malicious accusations and frivolous claims.”78 Increasingly, however, courts are raising the bar on what
constitutes a reasonable belief and using that requirement as grounds to
deny plaintiffs’ retaliation claims.79
For example, in Clark County School District v. Breeden,80 the Supreme Court denied a plaintiff’s retaliation claim after noting that “no
one could reasonably believe that the [alleged predicate discrimination]
violated Title VII.”81 In that case, an employee alleged that she was
transferred as punishment for complaining internally about sexual harassment arising from a one-time, situation-appropriate exchange in
which a supervisor repeated another person’s sexual comment in the
plaintiff’s presence.82 Because sexual harassment must be “severe or
75. Pettway, 411 F.2d at 1007. But see Lawrence D. Rosenthal, Reading Too Much Into What
the Court Doesn’t Write: How Some Federal Courts Have Limited Title VII’s Participation Clause’s
Protections After Clark County School District v. Breeden, 83 WASH. L. REV. 345, 357 (2008)
(describing several cases that have, post-Breeden, imposed a “reasonable belief” requirement for
retaliation cases under the participation clause as well (internal quotation marks omitted)).
76. See, e.g., Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1182 (7th Cir. 1982). The
court stated:
The mistake must, of course, be a sincere one; and presumably it must be reasonable . . .
for it seems unlikely that the framers of Title VII would have wanted to encourage the filing of utterly baseless charges by preventing employers from disciplining the employees
who made them. But it is good faith and reasonableness, not the fact of discrimination,
that is the critical inquiry in a retaliation case.
Id.
77. Brianne J. Gorod, Rejecting “Reasonableness”: A New Look at Title VII’s AntiRetaliation Provision, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1469, 1471 (2007).
78. Id. at 1472 (quoting Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1020 (D.C. Cir.
1981)).
79. Moberly, supra note 68, at 448.
80. 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam).
81. Id. at 270.
82. Id. at 269. Specifically, the plaintiff complained about an exchange that occurred when
she, her supervisor, and “another male employee” were meeting to review reports about four individuals who had applied for a job with the school district. Id. The report on one of the applicants
recounted that he had:
[O]nce commented to a co-worker, “I hear making love to you is like making love to the
Grand Canyon.” . . . [T]he [plaintiff’s] supervisor read the comment aloud, [and then]
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pervasive” in order to be actionable, the Court refused to recognize that
the plaintiff’s complaint about a seemingly minor incident warranted
protection from retaliation.83
Other cases since Breeden have also denied protection from retaliation to plaintiffs who complained about harassment that they could not
have reasonably believed was severe or pervasive, including in cases
where the predicate harassment was arguably more serious than what
Breeden herself had challenged.84 Retaliation plaintiffs have been
thwarted by other mistakes of law regarding the predicate discrimination
as well.85
C. Critiques of the Narrowing of Reasonable Belief
Critics have argued that Breeden’s narrow reading of the reasonable
belief standard threatens to undermine the enforcement-enhancing purpose of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision.86 Professor Rosenthal argues that it “forces employees to essentially become employment law
experts before deciding whether to report behavior they believe is unlawful.”87 Professor Brake takes this point further, arguing that—especially
as to mistakes about whether harassment is pervasive—“[t]he problem is
not simply that most people lack the legal expertise to ascertain where
that line begins and ends, but that the uncertainties of litigation prevent
such a determination from being made in advance.”88 In other legal contexts, courts do not require a “reasonable person” to have expertise she or
he does not have reason to possess,89 and such requirements in retaliation

stated, “I don’t know what that means.” The other employee then said, “Well, I’ll tell you
later,” and both men chuckled.
Id. (citations omitted).
83. Id. at 270–71 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998)).
84. Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 336, 342–43 (4th Cir. 2006) (black plaintiff
suffered reprisals and was ultimately fired for reporting an employee who said, in the wake of the
capture of the D.C. sniper, “They should put those two black monkeys in a cage with a bunch of
black apes and let the apes f—k them” (internal quotation marks omitted)); George v. Leavitt, 407
F.3d 405, 408 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (black female plaintiff from Trinidad alleged she was punished after
reporting insulting and demeaning statements of her co-workers: “On different occasions, she was
told by three separate employees to ‘go back to Trinidad’ . . . . On these and other occasions, her coworkers shouted at her, told her that she should never have been hired, and told her to ‘shut up.’”).
85. Outside of the employment context, an appellate court held that a plaintiff was not protected from retaliation because he had complained about employer practices that had a disparate
impact based on race, a cause of action that had earlier been foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of Title VI’s implied private right of action. Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 310, 315
(4th Cir. 2003).
86. Brake, supra note 69, at 81–83; Lawrence D. Rosenthal, To Report or Not to Report: The
Case for Eliminating the Objectively Reasonable Requirement for Opposition Activities Under Title
VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1127, 1130 (2007).
87. Rosenthal, supra note 86, at 1131; see also Gorod, supra note 77, at 1492–93.
88. Brake, supra note 69, at 89.
89. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 290 cmt. f (1965) (“If the actor has special
knowledge, he is required to utilize it, but he is not required to possess such knowledge, unless he
holds himself out as possessing it or undertakes a course of conduct which a reasonable man would
recognize as requiring it.”); Gorod, supra note 77, at 1495 n.114 (contrasting the narrowing view of
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cases evoke harsh consequences on a complaining employee who gets it
wrong. If she complains too soon, before the harassment has become
pervasive, then she is vulnerable to retaliation for which she cannot turn
to Title VII for redress. If she complains too late, once the harassment
has become pervasive, she must not only endure additional harassment,90
but she may also be unable to prevail on the other elements of an eventual harassment claim, for two reasons. For one, her employer can argue
that her failure to complain suggests that the harassment was not “unwelcome,” one of the required elements for actionable harassment.91 The
employer can also argue that the employee’s failure to complain sooner
was unreasonable, which gives rise to an employer’s affirmative defense
against vicarious liability for harassment committed by a supervisor.92
Narrow interpretations of reasonable belief threaten employers’ interests
as well. When employees are deterred from complaining about problems
in the workplace, employers lack the information they require to stop
small problems from becoming big ones that deplete employee productivity and morale. Fearing retaliation, employees who would have otherwise complained internally may also choose instead to file formal EEOC
complaints, which are costlier and more time-consuming to defend.93
For these reasons, some have argued that the courts should abandon
the requirement that the plaintiff’s belief be objectively reasonable, leaving in place only the requirement of a good faith belief.94 Employers
would still be able to take adverse action against an employee who has
filed malicious or frivolous claims and, in the rest of cases, can protect
themselves against retaliation claims by refraining from taking punitive
action against a good faith complainant. This approach, while sensible,
may be unfeasible given the widespread adoption of the reasonable belief
standard in the wake of the Supreme Court’s endorsement in Breeden.95
Plaintiffs may have better outcomes by making stronger arguments about
the reasonableness of their beliefs. In this spirit, other critics advocate for
pushing the boundaries of what ought to constitute a reasonable belief for
the purposes of demarking conduct protected from retaliation. Professor
Brake proposes that courts shift the vantage point of reasonableness from
that of someone with knowledge of the law to that of an ordinary ema reasonable mistake in retaliation law to the much more generous view of reasonable mistake that
applies to defendants claiming qualified immunity).
90. Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 355 (4th Cir. 2006) (King, J., dissenting) (pointing out this “Catch-22”).
91. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).
92. Gorod, supra note 77, at 1489; Rosenthal, supra note 86, at 1159–60. An employer may
avoid liability for a supervisor’s harassment if (1) the employer has taken reasonable care to prevent
and correct harassment, and (2) it was unreasonable for employee not to avail herself of employer’s
prevention/correction opportunities. E.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805 (1998);
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
93. Gorod, supra note 77, at 1507–08; Rosenthal, supra note 86, at 1164–65.
94. Gorod, supra note 77, at 1500; Rosenthal, supra note 86, at 1149.
95. Rosenthal, supra note 86, at 1135, 1138 (describing how Breeden motivated some courts
to adopt an objective test).
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ployee.96 She also suggests that courts could set limits on the reasonable
belief standard by asking “whether the plaintiff can make a reasoned case
that the practices opposed interfere with the goals and objectives of discrimination law.”97 Another commentator suggests reforming how the
reasonable belief standard applies to cases of predicate harassment in
particular by accepting that an employee reasonably believes that an isolated incident of harassment is unlawful if the incident, when repeated,
would constitute a Title VII violation.98 As explained in Part III, cases
involving retaliation against LGBT plaintiffs who have complained of
harassment are particularly useful for advancing robust and persuasive
arguments for broadening the reasonable belief doctrine along the lines
these commentators have proposed. In addition to helping LGBT plaintiffs find relief under a law that does not provide direct protection, a focus on these cases could lead the push back on this encroaching doctrine.
D. Judicial Decisions Ignoring Gay Plaintiffs’ Reasonable Belief
Recently, LGBT plaintiffs have been among those whose retaliation
claims have been victims of the narrowing reasonable belief doctrine.
For example, in Larson v. United Air Lines,99 a gay customer service
manager alleged that he was furloughed by the airline in retaliation for
complaining about anonymous letters that he perceived to be disparaging
him because of his sexual orientation.100 Affirming the lower court’s
dismissal of this claim, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the
argument that Larson’s complaint amounted to protected conduct.101
Without citing Breeden or mentioning the reasonable belief standard, the
court required retaliation plaintiffs to demonstrate their “opposition to a
practice made an unlawful employment practice by Title VII.”102 Since
Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, the court reasoned, Larson’s conduct was not protected from retaliation under Title VII.103
96. Brake, supra note 69, at 103.
97. Id. Similarly, another recommendation is to maintain the objective standard but to evaluate the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s belief based on the “totality of circumstances”—including
among other factors whether the courts and other authorities are unanimous about whether particular
conduct violates Title VII. Matthew W. Green, Jr., What’s So Reasonable about Reasonableness?
Rejecting a Case Law-Centered Approach to Title VII’s Reasonable Belief Doctrine, 62 U. KAN. L.
REV. 759, 799–800 (2014).
98. Gorod, supra note 77, at 1497–98.
99. 482 F. App’x 344 (10th Cir. 2012).
100. Id. at 345–46.
101. Id. at 350.
102. Id. at 351 (quoting Petersen v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 301 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir. 2002))
(internal quotation mark omitted).
103. Id. The court also rejected the argument that the predicate was discriminatory, since the
first anonymous letter was severely dealt with by the airline (leaving Larson no discrimination to
complain about), and the second letter did not specifically reference Larson or expressly evince
hostility towards his sexual orientation. Id. Additionally, the court determined that Larson had not
demonstrated a causal connection between his complaints about the letters and his eventual furlough,
since those who had taken his complaint were not involved in the furlough decision. Id.
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Similarly, in Gilbert v. Country Music Association,104 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of an openly gay union
member’s claim that his union withheld referrals because he complained
that a fellow union member had “called him a ‘faggot’ and threatened to
stab him.”105 First, the court determined that the predicate harassment
was not actionable sexual harassment.106 Though the court recognized
that Title VII protects against harassment motivated by the victim’s failure to conform to gender stereotypes, the victim’s same-sex orientation
does not itself qualify as nonconforming behavior.107 Rather, the plaintiff
must be targeted for gender nonconformity in his “‘behavior observed at
work or affecting his job performance,’ such as his ‘appearance or mannerisms on the job,’”108 which the plaintiff in this case did not allege.109
Then, having concluded that the predicate harassment was motivated by
sexual orientation rather than sex, the court dispensed Gilbert’s retaliation claim in a single sentence.110 Giving no consideration to whether he
could have reasonably believed that the harassment was actionable, the
court dismissed the retaliation claim for the simple reason that Gilbert
had opposed conduct that was not itself prohibited by Title VII.111
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has also rejected a gay plaintiff’s retaliation claim. In Hamner v. St. Vincent Hospital & Health Care
Center, Inc.,112 the plaintiff alleged that he was terminated from his job
as a nurse because he complained about a supervising doctor’s harassing
comments.113 After a trial, the lower court granted summary judgment in
favor of the hospital, which Hamner appealed.114 The Seventh Circuit
analyzed lengthy excerpts of Hamner’s trial testimony about the nature
of the internal grievance he had filed.115 Despite Hamner’s testimony that
he believed the doctor’s conduct—which included mocking him by lisping and making limp wrists—was harassment because of sex, the court
read the trial transcript to support the lower court’s conclusion that the
doctor’s “homophobia” motivated Hamner’s complaint.116 Yet even
though the court concluded that this predicate harassment was not actionable under Title VII, the court went on to consider whether, for pur104. 432 Fed. App’x 516 (6th Cir. 2011).
105. Id. at 518, 521.
106. Id. at 519.
107. Id. at 519–20.
108. Id. at 519 (quoting Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2006)).
109. Id. at 520 (rejecting the plaintiff’s allegation that “homosexual males did not conform to
[the harasser’s] male stereotypes” as an insufficient “formulaic recitation” of the gender nonconformity element (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2000).
113. Id. at 703.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 706 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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poses of his retaliation claim, Hamner reasonably believed otherwise.117
To this end, the court required that to be reasonable, the plaintiff’s complaint must at least fall into a category of discrimination that is covered
by Title VII, and Hamner’s complaint, having been construed to be about
sexual orientation rather than sex, did not qualify.118
While these three cases reach the same result, the depth of the
courts’ respective analyses range in their complexity. The Tenth Circuit
denied the gay plaintiff’s retaliation claim simply because Title VII does
not cover sexual orientation.119 The Sixth Circuit at least considered the
possibility that the gay plaintiff might have suffered discrimination on
the basis of sex, but then rejected the retaliation claim without bothering
to distinguish the plaintiff’s reasonable belief from the court’s conclusion
that he did not.120 Finally, the Seventh Circuit did distinguish between
actionable harassment and harassment a plaintiff reasonably could have
believed was so, but nevertheless rejected the idea that a plaintiff could
reasonably believe that harassment motivated by sexual orientation is
prohibited.121 Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hamner is
the only one of the three decisions to predate Breeden, yet it is the only
one to actually consider the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s belief in the
illegality of the underlying harassment. Yet, the court’s analysis of that
standard is arguably flawed, for two reasons. First, the court’s reasonable
belief analysis was limited to whether Hamner reasonably believed sexual orientation discrimination was illegal;122 it did not consider whether
Hamner could have reasonably believed that the sexual orientation discrimination he endured was actually, or also, discrimination because of
sex—an omission made more blameworthy by the fact that the doctor’s
teasing included imitating the voice and gestures of stereotyped effeminate men.123 The second flaw of the Hamner decision is that, when read
together with Breeden, it leaves nothing left of reasonable belief and
effectively requires the plaintiff to prove the illegality of the predicate
discrimination.124 In Breeden, the Court detected an unreasonable belief
based on the insufficient degree of harassment rather than its type.125 If
117. Id. at 706–07.
118. Id. at 707.
119. Larson v. United Air Lines, 482 F. App’x 344, 351 (10th Cir. 2011).
120. Gilbert v. Country Music Ass’n., 432 Fed. App’x 516, 519–20 (6th Cir. 2011).
121. Hamner, 224 F.3d at 706–07.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. The Seventh Circuit’s analysis of reasonable belief has not changed since Breeden, as
more recent decisions have relied on Hamner for the principle that “[t]he objective reasonableness of
the belief is not assessed by examining whether the conduct was persistent or severe enough to be
unlawful, but merely whether it falls into the category of conduct prohibited by the statute.” Magyar
v. Saint Joseph Reg’l Med. Ctr., 544 F.3d 766, 771 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Hamm v. Weyauwega
Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1066 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting retaliation claim of a heterosexual
male plaintiff who complained about same-sex harassment that the court determined was not actionable).
125. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270–71 (2001).
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mistakes of type are also excluded from reasonable belief, as the Seventh
Circuit appears to hold, there is hardly anything left for a harassed employee to be reasonably mistaken about—a result that Breeden itself
forecloses.
E. Judicial Decisions Affirming Gay Plaintiffs’ Reasonable Belief
Two courts have found in favor of gay plaintiffs seeking to advance
retaliation claims based on predicate discrimination that turned out not to
be unlawful under Title VII. In Dawson v. Entek International,126 the
plaintiff appealed the lower court’s dismissal of both his hostileenvironment sexual harassment claim and his claim that the employer
terminated him in retaliation for reporting the harassment.127 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the plaintiff had not alleged actionable sexual harassment because “Dawson presented no evidence that he
failed to conform to a gender stereotype” and even testified himself that
he “does not exhibit effeminate traits.”128 Nevertheless, the court reversed the lower court’s dismissal of his retaliation claim.129 Without
expressly addressing the reasonable belief standard, the court concluded
simply that “Dawson engaged in protected activity when he visited [a
person] in human resources to discuss his treatment and file a complaint.
This was a complaint to human resources staff based directly on sexual
orientation discrimination.”130 Though the analysis is sparse, the court
seemed to have considered the plaintiff’s belief that Title VII prohibits
sexual orientation discrimination to be a reasonable one.
In a later decision applying Dawson, a federal district court in California suggests as much. In that case, McCarthy v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,131 two employees prevailed at trial on a claim that their employer
took adverse action against them after they complained about sexual harassment as well as the harassment of their gay co-worker.132 The employer challenged the jury instruction, which defined activity protected
from retaliation as “complaining to the defendant . . . based on the plaintiff's reasonable belief that her employer was engaged in unlawful conduct, which includes subjecting an employee to a sexually hostile work
environment or discriminating against an employee on account of race,
age, sex, or sexual orientation.”133 Relying on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Dawson, the court affirmed that the jury was properly instructed
to consider complaints about sexual orientation to be protected activity

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

630 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 932.
Id. at 937.
Id.
Id. at 936.
No. CIV. 2:09–2495 WBS DAD, 2011 WL 4006634 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2011).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *3.
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for purposes of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision.134 In so doing, the
court supplied some of the missing analysis that would have made the
Dawson decision more clear. In particular, the court raised and applied
the reasonable belief standard:
There cannot be any doubt that the plaintiffs in this case
were reasonable in believing that Title VII prohibited defendant from terminating their coworker based on his sexual orientation. Not only has there been a growing gay rights movement
in this country, the courts have also recognized sexual orientation as a status that merits heightened protection. Accordingly,
based on the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Dawson and because
plaintiffs were reasonable in believing that Title VII prohibited
defendant from discriminating based on sexual orientation, the
court’s inclusion of “sexual orientation” in Instruction No. 11
was a correct statement of the law and does not merit a new
trial.135
In support of the second sentence quoted above, the court cited judicial decisions ruling in favor of same-sex marriage and narrowing the
Defense of Marriage Act, law review articles arguing for expansive definitions of sexual harassment under Title VII that would include sexual
orientation discrimination, provisions of California law that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and federal regulatory
policy construing the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 to include discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.136 This decision is a promising example of how courts could construe reasonable belief, and it will
serve as a foundation for some of the arguments provided in the next
Part.
In addition to these two cases affirming that complaining about antiLGBT harassment is protected conduct, there have also been decisions
where the courts assumed arguendo that was the case. While not as useful to LGBT plaintiffs as Dawson or McCarthy, these decisions are at
least worth noting for the mere fact that even outside of the Ninth Circuit, some courts, unlike those in Larson and Gilbert, refrain from casually restricting the scope of protected conduct to exclude discrimination
reported by LGBT plaintiffs. In one such case, a federal district court in
New York cited the reasonable belief standard as the basis for its assumption that a lesbian plaintiff’s complaints were protected from retaliation under Title VII, even where the court had already determined that
the predicate harassment was itself not actionable.137 The court preferred
134. Id. at *3–4.
135. Id. at *4 (footnote omitted).
136. Id. at *4 n.5.
137. Jantz v. Emblem Health, No. 10 Civ. 6076(PKC), 2012 WL 370297, at *13 n.9 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 6, 2012). Though the plaintiff alleged that she was targeted for harassment because of her
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instead to grant summary judgment on other grounds, namely, that she
had not proffered sufficient evidence of a causal connection between the
protected activity and her eventual termination.138 Similarly, a federal
court in Alabama assumed for argument’s sake that a transgender plaintiff’s complaint about sex discrimination amounted to protected conduct,139 even though the sex discrimination claim itself had been dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence from which to construe bias.140
Here, too, the retaliation claim failed on other grounds.141
III. TOWARDS A MORE ROBUST ANALYSIS OF LGBT PLAINTIFFS’
REASONABLE BELIEFS
Discrimination against LGBT employees is a pervasive problem
that advocates should challenge by all available means. Political efforts
aimed at persuading Congress to pass a federal law that prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender
identity142 will, when successful, largely close the gap that leaves LGBT
Americans vulnerable to discrimination under federal law.143 In the
failure to conform to gender stereotypes in her attraction to and relationship with a female partner,
the court construed this as sexual orientation discrimination not actionable under Title VII. Id. at *7.
138. Id. at *7.
139. Parris v. Keystone Foods, LLC, 959 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1301 (N.D. Ala. 2013); see also
Sturchio v. Ridge, No. CV-03-0025-RHW, 2005 WL 1502899, at *10 (E.D. Wash. 2005) (“It is
undisputed that the Plaintiff [who complained about sex discrimination related to her gender transition] engaged in protected activity.”).
140. Parris, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 1301.
141. Id. at 1312.
142. The latest version of the perennially-proposed Employment Non-Discrimination Act
(ENDA) would do exactly that. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th
Cong. § 4(a) (2013), which states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment of the individual, because of such individual’s actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity.
Id.
143. “Largely” refers to the strong possibility that Congress would pass a version of ENDA
that exempts religious organizations, or possibly even secular employers with a religious objection,
from having to comply. Indeed, the recent version of ENDA passed by the Senate contained an
exemption for religious organizations, though an amendment that would have expanded the exemption to include objecting secular employers failed to pass. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of
2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. § 6; Ramsey Cox, Senate Passes ENDA Amendment Designed to Protect
Churches, THE HILL (Nov. 6, 2013, 12:15 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/189434senate-adopts-amendment-to-enda-aimed-at-protecting-churches. In contrast, Title VII only permits
such employers to discriminate against non-ministerial employees on the basis of religion, not on the
basis of other protected characteristics (the ministerial exemption, in contrast, applies to discrimination on the basis of religion and other protected characteristics). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012)
(“This subchapter shall not apply . . . to a religious corporation, association, educational institution,
or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work
connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of
its activities.”); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706
(2012) (recognizing religious institution’s exemption from antidiscrimination laws in the hiring of
those it deems to be ministers). Should any version of a religious exemption be included in the
version of ENDA that ultimately becomes law, Title VII would remain the only federal law potentially available to LGBT non-ministerial employees to challenge discrimination by religious employers who are exempt from ENDA.
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meantime, of course, advocates can also employ a litigation strategy that
seeks to incrementally expand courts’ interpretation of sex discrimination
covered by Title VII. At the same time, advocates should not ignore opportunities to also push back on the courts’ narrowing protection against
retaliation for LGBT employees who reasonably believe that discrimination they have suffered is unlawful.144 By pushing equally hard on retaliation claims, advocates increase a client’s chances of obtaining some
relief. Additionally, the success of such efforts would strengthen the
law’s protection against retaliation, which in turn could motivate LGBT
employees to speak up about discrimination on the job. Such whistleblowing is the crucial precursor to litigation that continues to push for
robust interpretations of sex discrimination under Title VII. It can also
yield examples useful in the political arena to persuade Congress and
those with influence that the Employment Non-Discrimination Act
(ENDA) is necessary. In other words, it is worth pushing hard on retaliation claims, not only for the individual litigant’s sake, but in the interest
of supporting the efforts to challenge anti-LGBT discrimination on all
respective fronts. The remainder of this Part will explore arguments that
could be useful to this end.
A. Employees Might Reasonably Believe That Discrimination Based on
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Is Already Prohibited by
Federal Law
When LGBT employees report that they have been the victim of unlawful harassment, they may be doing so on the basis of a mistaken, yet
reasonable, belief that federal law bans discrimination based on sexual
orientation and gender identity. Indeed, surveys show that such protections are not only favored by a majority of Americans, but they are also
widely assumed to already exist.145 As the federal district court noted in
McCarthy, this belief seems reasonable when viewed against the backdrop of LGBT (particularly lesbian and gay) victories in the courts and in

144. Cf. Kiley v. Am. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 296 Fed. App’x 107, 108
(2d Cir. 2008) (plaintiff who lost on sexual orientation and sex stereotyping claim did not even
appeal dismissal of his retaliation claim); Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 761 n.1 (6th
Cir. 2006) (Vickers “fail[ed] to make any argument regarding his Title VII retaliation claim,” so
therefore it was waived).
145. A survey by the Center for American Progress found that “9 of out [sic] 10 voters erroneously think that a federal law is already in place protecting gay and transgender people from workplace discrimination.” Krehely, supra note 10; see also Victoria Schwartz, Title VII: A Shift from Sex
to Relationships, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 209, 210–11 (2012). In her article Schwartz states:
[A] 2007 poll found that only one-third of American adults were aware that federal
law . . . does not provide protection for employees on the basis of sexual orientation. At
the same time, public opinion polls suggest that Americans do not find the idea of protection against employment discrimination based on sexual orientation particularly controversial. A 2008 Gallup poll found that support for homosexuals having equal rights in job
opportunities has jumped from fifty-six percent in 1977 to eighty-nine percent.
Id. (footnotes omitted).

952

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:4

the political arena.146 Marriage equality is arguably a more controversial
prospect than employment nondiscrimination, so the fact that same-sex
marriage is now legal in a majority of states (thirty-six as of this writing)147—as well as recognized for purposes of federal law148—could realistically contribute to the public perception that equality in the workplace
is at least as secure. In the context of employment, LGBT rights are also
on the rise. Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia ban employment discrimination on the basis of either sexual orientation or gender
identity, as do more than two hundred cities and counties.149 Additionally, in 2011 Congress repealed the most notorious example of pervasive
employment discrimination against gays and lesbians—the military’s
Don’t Ask Don’t Tell policy.150 The widespread erroneous belief in federal protection against harassment of gay workers could even partially
derive from the Supreme Court’s decision in Oncale,151 which did not
involve a gay plaintiff but was widely reported as a gay-rights victory.152
At the same time, news of courtroom victories for LGBT plaintiffs such
as Diane Schroer does not necessarily emphasize the nuances of the
judge’s sex discrimination rationale,153 which could also lead the general
public to erroneously believe the law protects gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgender individuals by virtue of their status as such.154
As the district court decision in McCarthy shows, it is possible for
courts to accept that a whistleblower reasonably believes that federal law
prohibits status-based discrimination against LGBT workers based on
these examples of momentum in the gay-rights movement, both in the
employment context and in general. Polling data about the public’s mistaken belief that such laws already exists makes this argument even
stronger.155 Its weakness, however, is that it requires courts to accept
what I will call a “categorical mistake” (believing a certain category of
discrimination is prohibited when it is not) as a reasonable belief, which
146. McCarthy v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. CIV. 2:09–2495 WBS DAD, 2011 WL
4006634, at *4 n.5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2011).
CONF.
S T.
LEGISLATURES,
147. See
Same
Sex
Marriage
Laws,
NAT’L
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-laws.aspx (last updated Jan. 19,
2015).
148. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691–93 (2013).
149. Pizer et al., supra note 1, at 755, 757.
150. Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–321, § 2(f)(1)(A), 124 Stat.
3515, 3516 (2010).
151. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998); see supra Part I.C.
152. E.g., Joan Biskupic, Same-Sex Harassment Is a No-No, Says Court; Landmark Ruling
Covers Situations with Both Gay and Non-Gay Participants, MOBILE REG., Mar. 5, 1998, at 1A;
Richard Carelli, Same-Sex Harassing Is Illegal: Employer, Gay-Rights Groups Praise Supreme
Court Ruling, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Mar. 5, 1998, at 1A; David Jackson, Court Ruling on SameSex Harassment Also Victory for Gay, Lesbian Workers, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Mar. 5, 1998.
153. Jesse J. Holland, Judge Rules Transgender Discrimination Is Illegal, STAR-LEDGER
(Newark), Sept. 20, 2008, at 16; Former Army Commander Wins Transgender Lawsuit, TIMES
UNION (Albany), Sept. 20, 2008, at 5.
154. Gorod, supra note 77, at 1494 (“Moreover, employees’ understandings of what constitutes
harassment will be shaped in large part by media accounts.”).
155. See supra note 145.
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some courts have already refused to do.156 This tendency, however, demonstrably undermines Title VII enforcement. For the reasonable belief
doctrine to mean anything at all, it has to allow whistleblowers to make
some kinds of mistakes about the legal status of predicate discrimination.
Especially where courts also insist on rejecting reasonable mistakes
about the pervasiveness that harassment must reach to be actionable,
rejecting reasonable categorical mistakes leaves effectively nothing left
for an employee to be reasonably mistaken about. This result would eviscerate a doctrine that is both longstanding and that enjoys the apparent
endorsement of the Supreme Court,157 and ought to be challenged as
such.
B. Employees Might Reasonably Believe That Anti-LGBT Discrimination
Is Also Prohibited Sex Discrimination
When LGBT plaintiffs report harassment or other discrimination
that turns out not to be unlawful, they could also reasonably be mistaken
in believing that they were complaining about actionable sex discrimination. This is because when targeted for discrimination, sex, gender, and
sexual orientation are often, and reasonably, conflated. Sex is widely
understood to refer to one’s anatomical status as male or female.158 Gender is the socially-prescribed roles associated with sex, i.e., attributes that
are masculine or feminine.159 Sexual orientation is an individual’s sexual
or romantic attraction to either members of the same, other, or both sexes.160 To say that sex and gender are conflated in our culture is to say that
society generally expects one’s anatomical sex to forecast much about an
individual’s behavior, personality, appearance, interests, and qualities.
Sexual orientation is also conflated with both sex and gender. Society
expects those of the male sex to be sexually attracted to those of the female sex; heterosexuality is part of what it is to be masculine.161 If society conflates sex, gender, and sexual orientation, then one could reasonable perceive that the mindset of a discriminating employer likely follows
suit.
To put this more concretely, imagine a hypothetical gay employee.
He complains to his employer about co-workers who harass him verbally
and physically, regularly calling him a faggot. Whether or not this complaint is protected from retaliation depends on whether he reasonably
believes the harassment to be motivated by gender nonconformity. Of
course, the co-workers’ use of the word “faggot” implies animus towards
156. See supra note 85 and Part II.D.
157. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001).
158. Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation of Sex, Gender
& Sexual Orientation to its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 161, 164 (1996).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV.
187, 196.
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his sexual orientation, which the courts do not see as synonymous with
gender.162 But the employee may still reasonably perceive that his masculinity is ultimately, or simultaneously, the target. Because he does not
date and sleep with women, his masculinity does not measure up to his
co-workers’ expectations about the male sex. To him, this situation may
be as much about gender as harassment mocking him for effeminate
mannerisms. Because it is only courts’ esoteric concerns about “bootstrapping” that keep them from reading Price Waterhouse to prohibit the
“faggot” situation as well as the harassment based on his effeminate
mannerisms, they should forgive the average employee who has not read
the case law for not intuiting this distinction.
1. Reasonableness Supported by Social Science Research
Social science research validates the reasonableness of viewing anti-gay harassment as a means of policing gender. Sociologist Michael
Kimmel, for example, describes homophobia as a “central organizing
principle of our cultural definition of manhood.”163 In our patriarchal
society, men ascribe power to themselves by calling out other men’s
gender nonconformity—an act that reaffirms their own compliance with
“hegemonic” masculinity, the version of masculinity that is most powerful in society.164 Hegemonic masculinity requires the “relentless repudiation of the feminine,” including, perhaps especially, the “feminine” sexual practice of having or desiring sex with men.165 Anti-gay harassment,
then, is a tool for generating and assigning male privilege.166
Researchers have confirmed that heterosexual men’s negative attitudes about homosexuality derive from its perceived threat to their masculinity, rather than aversion to homosexual orientation per se.167 The
connection between masculinity and homonegativity can also be seen in
research documenting heterosexual men’s (but not heterosexual wom-

162. See supra note 36.
163. Michael S. Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in the Construction of Gender Identity, in THEORIZING MASCULINITIES 119, 131 (Harry Brod & Michael
Kaufman eds., 1994).
164. See id. at 124–25, 131.
165. Id. at 125.
166. Id. at 131–32; see also MICHAEL A. MESSNER, TAKING THE FIELD: WOMEN, MEN, AND
SPORTS 67–68 (2002); C.J. PASCOE, DUDE, YOU’RE A FAG: MASCULINITY AND SEXUALITY IN HIGH
SCHOOL 52–83 (2007).
167. Michelle Davies, Correlates of Negative Attitudes Toward Gay Men: Sexism, Male Role
Norms, and Male Sexuality, 41 J. SEX RES. 259, 259 (2004); Scott W. Keiller, Masculine Norms as
Correlates of Heterosexual Men’s Attitudes Toward Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 11 PSYCHOL.
MEN & MASCULINITY 38, 48 (2010).
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en’s) less favorable view of gay men than lesbians,168 and the disparaging
of effeminate gay men within the gay-male community.169
2. Reasonableness Supported by Dicta of a Federal District Court
In addition to scientific authority, legal authority also sometimes
recognizes the inherent interrelation of sexual orientation, gender, and
sex—further marking as “reasonable” an employee’s impression of antigay harassment being motivated by gender. In Centola v. Potter,170 a
federal district court in Massachusetts held in favor of a gay-male employee whose co-workers used anti-gay slurs and teased him about being
gay.171 Though holding that the plaintiff had provided sufficient evidence
that he was targeted for gender-nonconforming appearance and behavior,
the court went on to say:
The gender stereotype at work here is that “real” men should date
women, and not other men. Conceivably, a plaintiff who is perceived
by his harassers as stereotypically masculine in every way except for
his actual or perceived sexual orientation could maintain a Title VII
cause of action alleging sexual harassment because of his sex due to
his failure to conform with sexual stereotypes about what “real” men
172
do or don’t do.

To be sure, the dicta quoted here, over ten years old, still represents an
extreme minority view among the federal courts, which generally do not
view homosexuality as a gender nonconformity for purposes of applying
Title VII.173 But the fact that it has not convinced the majority of courts
to recognize anti-gay harassment as sex discrimination does not foreclose
its value in retaliation cases by serving as a testament to the reasonableness of that belief.174

168. Gregory M. Herek, Sexual Prejudice and Gender: Do Heterosexuals’ Attitudes Toward
Lesbians and Gay Men Differ?, 56 J. SOC. ISSUES 251, 255 (2000).
169. Francisco J. Sánchez & Eric Vilain, “Straight-Acting Gays”: The Relationship Between
Masculine Consciousness, Anti-Effeminacy, and Negative Gay Identity, 41 ARCHIVES SEXUAL
BEHAV. 111, 112 (2012).
170. 183 F. Supp. 2d 403 (D. Mass. 2002).
171. Id. at 407.
172. Id. at 410 (footnote omitted). It is also worth noting that the Centola court also went on to
consider the plaintiff’s retaliation claim and, in that context, persuasively dispensed with the employer’s argument that the employee had not engaged in protected conduct because he did not call it
sexual harassment when he reported it. Id. at 412. It was enough to the court that the plaintiff “presented to his employers . . . events that, viewed in the light most favorable to him, constituted discrimination against him on the basis of his sex due to sexual stereotyping.” Id.
173. Though, it was cited recently by a federal district court in Virginia, which rejected a
defendant’s motion to dismiss a Title VII case involving anti-gay harassment. Henderson v. Labor
Finders of Va., Inc., No. 3:12cv600, 2013 WL 1352158, at *4 (E.D. Va. Apr. 2, 2013) (citing Centola, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 408–09).
174. See Gorod, supra note 77, at 1495–96 (“If the courts cannot agree, how are the individual
citizens supposed to know?”).
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3. Reasonableness Supported by the Emerging Position of the
EEOC
In further support of the reasonableness of an employee’s belief that
Title VII prohibits anti-LGBT discrimination, the EEOC has signaled
that it, too, shares this belief. For one thing, the EEOC’s interpretation of
sex discrimination in Macy should not only support the reasonableness of
any transgender plaintiff’s belief that discrimination is actionable, it is
also broad enough to permit the conclusion that homosexuality, too, is
protected from discrimination under Title VII. For one thing, the EEOC
endorsed a broad reading of Price Waterhouse that “gender discrimination occurs any time an employer treats an employee differently for failing to conform to any gender-based expectations or norms.”175 The
EEOC did not say “only those gender-based expectations or norms related to how the employee behaves or appears in the workplace.”176 Additionally, the EEOC broadly read Price Waterhouse’s admonition that “an
employer may not take gender into account in making an employment
decision” to provide another reason, in addition to sex stereotyping, why
transgender discrimination is actionable sex discrimination.177 An employer who discriminates against a gay or lesbian employee is taking
gender into account in an equally broad way, in that the employer is considering the gender of the employee relative to the gender of the person
to whom he or she is sexually attracted.178
The EEOC spells this connection out more expressly in two separate, nonbinding decisions from 2011. In one, a gay employee filed a
complaint against his employer, the Postal Service, to challenge harassment by his co-workers that stemmed from the public announcement of
his wedding to another man.179 The agency concluded that the employee
stated a claim of plausible sex discrimination because he essentially argued that the harassment was motivated “by [the harassing co-worker’s]
attitudes about stereotypical gender roles in marriage.”180 In the other
case, the EEOC determined that a lesbian employee, chided by her manager about her presumed sexual practices, had stated an actionable claim
for sexual harassment, having “alleged that [the manager’s] comment

175. Macy v. Holder, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012).
176. Of course, as discussed in the text at notes 34–35, supra, this position conflicts with that
of courts like the Sixth Circuit, which has expressly limited gender nonconformity protected from
discrimination under Title IX to that which is observable at work. See Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr.,
453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006).
177. Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *7 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244
(1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
178. Perkins, supra note 67, at 440–41.
179. Veretto v. Donahoe, No. 0120110873, 2011 WL 2663401, at *1 (E.E.O.C. July 1, 2011).
180. Id. at *3.
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was motivated by his attitudes about stereotypical gender roles in relationships.”181
The EEOC position may eventually influence the courts to view
sexual orientation discrimination as a form of sex discrimination. Meanwhile, however, it should also be cited in support of LGBT plaintiffs’
reasonable belief in the interconnected nature of discrimination targeting
sex, gender, and sexual orientation for purposes of sustaining a retaliation claim.
CONCLUSION
Until Congress enumerates sexual orientation and gender identity as
characteristics protected from employment discrimination, LGBT workers who experience status-based discrimination on the job must allege
sex discrimination in order to gain relief under federal law. This approach is inherently limited by courts’ insistence that sex discrimination
should not subsume all discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
or gender identity. As advocates continue to push back against this restrictive approach, they should also make vigorous arguments in support
of employees’ attendant retaliation claims. Though courts do not always
apply it faithfully, the reasonable belief doctrine ensures that retaliation
plaintiffs’ success does not turn on whether they were technically correct
that the predicate discrimination was unlawful. Given, then, that retaliation plaintiffs are allowed to be reasonably mistaken, mistakes about the
legal status of discrimination against LGBT employees are good candidates for the label “reasonable.” Aside from reasonably believing that
sexual orientation and transgender status are protected in their own right,
the interrelatedness of sex, gender, and sexual orientation support a reasonable belief that the challenged discrimination is sufficiently genderrelated to warrant protection. Because there are so many arguments in
support of a reasonable mistake about the legal status of anti-LGBT discrimination, these cases make an excellent vehicle to remind courts of
the proper application of reasonable belief doctrine. When these arguments succeed, the retaliation doctrine will afford LGBT plaintiffs the
protection they need to more aggressively report discrimination when it
occurs. These reports, in turn, will help generate the case law necessary
to push back on the limited definition of sex discrimination and support
the political efforts to pass statutory protections for sexual orientation
and gender identity discrimination.

181.
2011).

Castello v. Donahoe, No. 0120111795, 2011 WL 6960810, at *2 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 20,

